Globalization and E-Commerce III. The French Enviroment and Policy

According to most indicators, the use of the Internet and the development of e-commerce (over the Internet) in France are below the level that should be reached given the French level of development. This observation can be explained by the late adoption of digital technologies by the French. However, the French lateness is less important for professional uses than for domestic uses. France began to catch up with pioneering countries during 1999-2000, but the collapse Internet bubble reduced the pace of adoption. The French late adoption of digital technologies is partly the result of the strong involvement of France in the development of two pre-existing technologies: Minitel (principally dedicated to B2C) and EDI (dedicated to B2B). Both technologies provided the users with a sufficient level of service to support their business processes, but hindered their propensity to switch to new Internet-based technology. Consequently, most available indicators underestimate the actual level of e-commerce in France, especially the French business readiness to switching to Web-based commerce. The late adoption of technology was not the only inhibitor for e-commerce. In France\u27s recent economic history, decision makers focused for too long on other issues. France had to adapt its economy and its industry to a competitive and global environment. Since the State played a strong role in an economy that was not widely open to competition, a wide set of reforms took place between the mid-1980s and the late 1990s. However, this restructuring policy prepared France for the adoption of e-commerce. as France was transformed into a service economy. Most organizations became more flexible by externalizing non-core activities and by implementing modular principles of organization. French companies went international as well. This new business climate favored the adoption of e-business and e-commerce practice by the end of the 1990s. When macroeconomic and industrial restructurings were achieved, the French government launched a strong information society policy. Since 1998, the government furthered the deregulation of telecommunication services, reshaped the legal framework to adapt to digital technologies, promoted IT training and innovation, and developed e-government. These policies were both a component of and aligned with the year 2000 e-Europe initiative of the European Union (EU), which promoted the development of a strong digital economy. Specific support programs (in RD and development of content) were combined and an intensive effort for legislation and inter-member benchmarking occurred (to stimulate member states to align on the most advanced state), the Commission and the Council of the EU tried try to stimulate development of a dynamic digital industry in Europe, and to boost the adoption of digital technologies and the new-methods of work and business enabled by them. While the European and the French policies impacted the adoption of digital technologies and e-commerce development significantly, they were insufficient to really enable France to catch up. The bursting of the Internet bubble slowed the pace. Moreover, B2C e-commerce was inhibited by the efficiency of the French distribution system that serves at a low cost alternative to the Internet for most of the population. The existing installed base of EDI, especially in the automobile and distribution industries, inhibits B2B e-commerce over the Internet. Consequently, the French e-commerce path of development is unique since it relies less on the Internet than in many other countries. Despite these inhibitors, France is adopting digital technologies and related practices at a higher pace than the other European countries. Within France, e-commerce is quite different in the various regions and industries. The Paris area (one-fifth of the French population), the IT industry, the professional services and distribution industries, and large companies are as intensively digitized as most advanced countries, industries, and companies worldwide. H

The Political Character of Computing Developments: Citizens\u27 interests and Government Services

This paper focuses on how citizens\u27 interests are dealt with and mediated by means of computer technology. It examines the distribution of computing resources to different government activities and, indirectly, to different client groups. It asks to what extent the patterns of computer use reflect stable patterns of choice favoring some uses over others and, therefore, some client groups over others. Two political perspectives on the patterns of choice are considered: managerial rationalism and reinforcement politics. To the extent that managerial rationalism characterizes computing decisions, we would expect to see computing distributed in favor of these government activities that provide direct services to citizens, and that actually expand, rather than contract, the array of choices available to citizens. In contrast, to the extent that reinforcement politics characterizes computing decisions, we would expect to see computing used in support of routine administrative activities, basic local government services, bureaucratic control over government departments and agencies, and social control over the recipients of social services such as welfare, health, and recreation. To examine which of these perspectives best characterizes computing in public organizations, we examine the portfolios of investment in computer based applications, using data collected from over 700 city and county governments in the United States. First, we look at the extent to which computing is applied to different local government functions. This examination suggests that computing tends to reinforce the traditional emphases of local governments towar

The Development and Application of a Process-oriented Thermometer of IT Business Value

The issue of whether firms are receiving an adequate return on their investment in information technology (IT) continues to pervade managerial decision making. While productivity and other financial metrics are established hallmarks of IT investment evaluation, research has called for broader and richer metrics that can take into account the diversity of IT impacts. In this paper, we extend previous instrument development research to develop and test a process-oriented thermometer of IT business value using survey data based on executives\u27 perceptions of IT impacts at multiple points along the value chain. Consistent with earlier research, we find that our process measures are sensitive to differences in industry, firm size, and business strategy. Through additional analysis of post-implementation reviews of IT impacts in four firms, we find consistency of within-firm perceptual measures among teams of senior executives, highlighting the potential for our thermometer to gauge the level of IT impacts within a single firm. We conclude that process-oriented perceptual measures can offer new and useful insights into IT impacts, complementing what we already know from firm-level objective metrics

Policy: An Information Systems Frontier

The information systems community can contribute more, not just to “public policy” but to the broader notion of policy that guides decisions toward desired outcomes. Policy entails politics. It requires knowing about policy promulgation, implementation, and effect. It requires some understanding of policy analysis. The policy analyst takes a scientific and systematic view of policy issues. Much policy is focused on the unglamorous issues of efficiency and effectiveness. The goal is to speak truth to power. This is the first in a series of papers to address policy

Evol uti on and Organizational Information Systems: An Assessment of Nol an\u27s Stage Model

The stage model of Richard Nolan, as published between 1973 and 1979, is the best known model of evolution related to organizational information systems. The model has been accepted as a sound description of this evolution, but has never been subjected to careful conceptual assessment. This paper eval uates the model in 1 ight of its logical structure and its pl ace within the larger realm of evol ution expl anatlons in the social sciences. The model evolved over a period of years. The original 1973 version derived from the S shaped logistic curve of growth in computing budgets. The three points of directional change in the curve were taken as a surrogate of major changes in the environment and management of computing within the organization, dividing the total curve into four sections Nol an called stages: initiation (beginning of use); contagion (rapid expansion of use); control (constraining response from top management to restrict growth); and integration (refinement of controls to accomplish organizational objectives in computing use). This basic descriptive hypothesis was elaborated in the 1974 version (with Cyrus Gibson) which added two significant features: definition of the primary driving agent in computing growth as change in technol ogy; and the devel opment of the model as an equilibrium model . The state of computing at any time was the result of an equilibrium between the stimulating forces of technical change and the constraining forces of manageri al control policies. The model was elaborated in 1977 and 1979 to include two new stages. Management policies were characterized as either slack policies (lack of control s, encouragement of innovation) or control policies (constraints on growth, encouragement of efficiency). The S curve was said to illustrate the organization\u27s learning curve in dealing with computing, in which management policy improves over time in its effectiveness at achieving desired results. A basic change was said to be underway in management attitude toward computing, from concentration on control of computing resources to control of organizational data resources, stimulated in part by the emerging technol ogy of database management systems. A new stage called data administration was added to the model, which would eventually give way to a sixth stage called maturity. In maturity managers woul d be sufficiently knowledgeable to effect a productive balance or equilibrium between sl ack (encouraging innovation) and control (encouraging efficiency). Our evaluation of the model reveal s probl ems with its assumptions. First, the empirical foundation of the model is questionable. Computing budgets are not likely to be effective surrogates for the wide range of variables they are said to represent, and, as subsequent empirical research has shown, do not necessarily conform to the S curve. Moreover, predictions made .using the model \u27s .assumptions have proven inaccurate. Second, the focus on technological change as the basic driving force in computing growth is probably too simplistic. It does not adequately deal with the many demand-related contextual factors of change that have been shown emplrically to be important. Third, the model implicitly assumes that there is cl arity and congruity on organizational goals for computing use among top managers, but this expectation is seldom uphel d. A 1 ack of congruity in goals weakens the assumption that acquisition of knowledge will automatically result in the development of appropriate management controls. Fourth, we doubt that knowledge of appropriate means for deal ing with computing will be as easy to acquire as the model suggests. There are many competi ng theories about how best to manage computing, and differences in organizational actors\u27 abilities to acquire knowledge and dispositions about how to use it. There is no specification in the model regarding how knowledge of appropriate policies leading to maturity will be found and applied. Fifth, balancing control vs. slack policles implies that managers have some idea of the di recti on computing use is headed. In fact, most policies are reactive, and the notion that balance can be deliberately achieved is questionable. Finally, the assumption that change actually proceeds in a continuous manner is not upheld either by the history of computing development in organizations or by other studies of organizational or social change. Within the context of evol ution expl anati ons in the social sciences, Nolan\u27 s model is an exampl e of evol utionist models, which assume same a priori direction of change and an expected end state of change, but seldom precisely specify the mechanisms whereby change takes pl ace. Nol an\u27 s model posits a definite end state (integration in the early versions, maturity in the 1 ater versions), but does not provide a detail ed account of how change takes pl ace. As such, Nolan\u27s model offers some useful insights, but suffers from problems common to evolutionist models: it is difficult to test empi rically, and does not offer a good account of why specific changes occur the way they do. Most importantly, the only empi rical test avall abl e for such model s (waiting to see whether predictions made using them prove to be correct) has not supported the Nolan model to date. The model remains an insightful organizing framework for thinking about computing change in organizations, but is not the empirically validated model of change some of its proponents claim it to be

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND TRANSITIONS IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE: A COMPARISON OF SCANDINAVIA AND THE UNITED STATES

New information technologies have the potential for transforming the ways governments are organized, the activities they perform, the manner which they are performed, and the nature of work itself. Governments in the US and Scandinavia have followed fundamental different approaches to the introduction of computing and to dealing with its effects. In the US, automation has been individualistic— each individual unit of government has introduced the technology for its own needs. For the most part, the systems that have been implemented have been small scale, have followed functional lines, have merely automated existing operations, have been implemented incrementally, and have evolved slowly over time. In contrast, in Scandinavia automation has been communal-systems have been designed, developed, and implemented by communal data processing agencies serving an entire level of government-national or local. The systems that have been introduced have been relatively large scale, have crossed functional lines, have involved the reorganization of work, have integrated both data and work processes, and have been implemented more or less simultaneously for all units or agencies of government. These differences in approach to automation have influences each country’s view of the role of government in anticipating and dealing with the effects of changes in computer technology on the public workforce

It diffusion in developing countries

here is widespread belief among international agencies and development specialists in the potential value of information technology (IT) to sup-port economic and human development [11, 12]. Some question whether IT alone can have a major impact on the standard of living in developing countries, but most see it offering access to vital information and services such as weather forecasting, commodity prices, health care, and education. However, a significant digital divide exists between richer and poorer countries in the use of IT and the availability of complementary assets such as telecommunications networks and skilled IT profes-sionals. This gap has led to a public debate about what can be done to promote greater IT use so that developing coun-tries can achieve the types of benefits already being enjoyed in the industrialized world. Policymakers need to recognize that developing economies have different drivers for IT investment than their wealthier brethren

Rob Kling: A Remembrance

This article presents a remembrance of Rob Kling, a long-time intellectual leader in IS by three colleagues who worked closely with him